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on the Act, the Supreme Court restated 
that the Act was constitutional and that 
it required a broad interpretation to 
protect citizens' equal enjoyment of 
the right to vote. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 
827. Further, the Court noted that the 
Act was aimed to protect citizens from 
subtle, as well as obvious, state efforts 
to deny the right to vote. Id. 
The Court made clear that the ini-
tial step in analyzing claims under sec-
tion 5 was to determine whether, or 
not, the changes altered the election 
law. Id. at 828. The Court found four 
basic typologies indicative, though not 
exhaustive, of section 5 claims. Id. 
Those typologies involved changes af-
fecting the manner of voting, the can-
didacy requirements and qualifications, 
the composition of the electorate, or 
the creation or abolition ofan elective 
office. Id. As a general rule, the Court 
said that a change must have "a direct 
relation to voting and the election pro-
cess." Id. at 829. 
The appellants, joined by a brieffor 
the United States as amicus curie, ar-
gued that the Common Fund Resolu-
tion fell within the Act's coverage be-
cause the value of each vote had been 
diminished. Id. They reasoned that the 
value of each vote decreased because 
the authority of each commissioner 
decreased. Id. Thus, the redistricting 
system designed to ensure black repre-
sentation became a token gesture. 
The Court, however, defined vot-
ing power as being dependant upon 
increases or decreases in the number of 
officials, not in the individual power 
an official holds while in office. Id. 
The Court opined that without drawing 
a restrained line between governmen-
tal decisions affecting voting and those 
that do not, section 5 would become an 
omnipotent statute applicable to virtu-
ally all facets of governmental activity. 
Id. 
As to the Unit System, the Court 
found that delegating authority to an 
appointed official was possibly analo-
gous to the replacement of an elected 
official with an appointed one. Id. at 
830. Nevertheless, the Court held that 
22 - The Law ForumJ22.3 
reallocations of authority within gov-
ernment could not constitute voting 
changes. Id. Furthermore, the Court 
stated that intraconstituency and 
interconstituency changes in authority 
may have affected voters, but neither 
case presented a change in voting for 
purposes of the Act. Id. at 831. 
The Court also recognized that the 
Attorney General's administrative in-
terpretation deserved considerable def-
erence, but noted that "[ d]eference does 
not mean acquiescence." Id. The 
Court determined that Congress un-
ambiguously stated that section 5 only 
covered changes in the rules governing 
voting. Id. at 833. As such, the Court 
found the Attorney General's position 
contrary to the Act and, therefore, not 
entitled to a high degree of deference. 
Id. 
The Court affirmed the decision of 
the district court but supplanted their 
own standard that a change must di-
rectly relate to the voting process to 
offend section 5. By making federal 
law more predictable to the states, the 
Court sought to enforce federalism as a 
''practical system of governance and 
not a mere poetic ideal." Id. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined 
by Justices White and Blackmun, 
pointed to the definition of "voting" 
given in the Act which includes "all 
action necessary to make a vote effec-
tive." Id. at 835 (emphasis added). 
Justice Stevens coupled this expansive 
language to the historical deprivation 
ofthe right to vote and created a litmus 
test for deciding whether section 5 
would apply. He concluded that when-
ever significant changes toward the 
disposition of power were made after a 
black person had assumed a position of 
power not historically held, those 
changes should be held suspect. Id. at 
838. 
It is likely that the Court will use 
cases such as these as mechanisms to 
federal restraint. By restrictively de-
fining key terms, the Supreme Court 
can severely curtail the social effects of 
federal legislation. The Voting Rights 
Act provided a system of quick review 
of suspect changes in power. Such 
claims may now be forced through the 
more expensive and circuitous court 
system. 
- Brett R. Wilson 
County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian 
Nation: THE INDIAN GENERAL 
ALLOTMENT ACT PERMITS 
COUNTIES TO IMPOSE AD VA-
LOREM TAXES BUT NOT EX-
CISE TAXES ON PATENTED 
LAND OWNED BY TRIBES AND 
TRIBE MEMBERS. 
In an opinion delivered by Justice 
Scalia, the Supreme Court in County of 
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 
S. Ct. 683 (1992), upheld and remanded 
the decision ofthe Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals holding that the Indian 
General Allotment Act ("Act"), per-
mits a county to impose an ad valorem 
tax upon land patented in fee, but does 
not permit a county to impose an ex-
cise tax upon the sale of such land. 
After reviewing land allotment to In-
dian tribes since the seventeen hun-
dreds to establish the purpose of the 
Act and how Congress intended it to 
affect the Indian nations, the Court 
concluded the Act was not implicitly 
repealed by subsequent acts of Con-
gress. 
This case involved approximately 
1.3 million acres of land, mostly in 
Yakima County, of which eighty per-
cent was held in trust by the United 
States. The remaining twenty percent 
was held in fee patent by Indians and 
non-Indians. Most ofthe property was 
located in Yakima County, Washing-
ton. Yakima County ("the County") 
imposed an ad valorem levy on taxable 
real property and an excise tax upon 
the sale of the land held in fee patent. 
When Yakima IndianNation, ("Yakima 
Nation"), the owners, refused to pay 
these taxes, the County attempted to 
foreclose on their property. 
Yakima Nation sought injunctive 
and declaratory relief in the Federal 
District Court for Washington State on 
the basis that the Act prohibits taxes on 
fee patented land held by tribes or 
Indians. The district court granted 
Yakima Nation summary judgment and 
an injunction prohibiting tax collec-
tion. On appeal to the ninth circuit, the 
appellate court reversed in part holding 
that whereas excise taxes were imper-
missible, ad valorem taxes were al-
lowed, as long as they did not have a 
'''demonstrably serious' impact on the 
'political integrity, economic security, 
or the health and welfare ofthe tribe, '" 
and remanded the case to the district 
court. Id. at 687. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. 
The Court began its analysis by 
examining congressional acts pertain-
ing to the protection of Indian rights. 
The Court first noted that in 1887, 
Congress had enacted the Indian Gen-
eral Allotment Act in order to extin-
guish tribal sovereignty, erase reserva-
tion boundaries and force the assimila-
tion ofIndians into society at large by 
granting land to tribe members inqi-
vidually. The Act additionally pro-
tected Indians from having their land 
fraudulently purchased from under 
them by holding the land in trust for 
twenty-five years by the United States. 
The Court then examined the Burke 
Act of 1906 which stated that Indians 
and tribes were not held accountable 
under state or territory laws until their 
trust period had expired. Id. at 686. 
Finally, the Court analyzed the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 which 
ended allotments to Indians and em-
phasized tribal self-determination and 
self-governance. Id. It further noted 
that this Act made no attempt to undo 
the allotment years by imposing re-
straints on the Indians' ability to alien-
ate or encumber the land, or by impair-
ing the rights of non-Indian title hold-
ers who held over two-thirds of the 
allotted Indian lands. Id. at 687. 
Regarding the issue of whether 
Congress explicitly permitted taxation 
upon these lands, the Court agreed 
with the County's contention that the 
Act gave express authority to tax fee 
patented land upon the expiration of a 
trustperiod. Id. at688 (citing Goudyv. 
Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906». 
The Court further agreed with the ninth 
circuit stating that Congress "mani-
fested a clear intention to permit a state 
to tax" Indian fee patented lands in the 
Burke Act. Id. (citingCountyofYakima 
v. Yakima Indian Nation, 903 F.2d 
1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1990». 
The Court rejected Yakima Nation's 
contention that the Burke Act was im-
plicitly repealed by the Indian Reorga-
nization Act based on Congress's defi-
nition of " Indian country" as including 
"all fee land within the boundaries of 
an existing reservation," held by Indi-
ans or non-Indians, and as preempting 
state criminal laws within "Indian 
Country" insofar as offenses by and 
against Indians were concerned. Id. at 
689 (citing Moe v. Confederated Salish 
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 
(1976». The Court also disagreed 
with the Tribe's assertion that the Act 
was impliedly repealed in 1953 when 
Congress enacted Public Law 280 
which authorized states in certain cir-
cumstances to assume civil and crimi-
nal jurisdiction over Indians within 
"Indian country." Id. 
Noting that repeals oflaw by impli-
cation were not looked upon favor-
ably, the Court decided that the Burke 
Act did not repeal the Act because the 
Burke Act enforced the contention that 
allotted land was to be "free from all 
restrictions as to sale, encumbrance or 
taxation." Id. at 690-91 (citing 25 
U.S.C. § 349). Further, it distinguished 
the decision in Moe from the decision 
in Goudy, noting that Moe was based 
upon personal jurisdiction with respect 
to taxation upon individual Indians, 
whereas Goudy was based upon in rem 
jurisdiction which subjected allotted 
lands to assessment and forced sale of 
the land for taxes upon becoming alien-
able and encumberable. Yakima, 112 
S. Ct. at 691. 
Next, the Court addressed whether 
the County's assertion of jurisdiction 
over reservation fee patented land 
would create an impracticable "check-
erboard" effect with respect to taxation 
ofland. Id. The Court held that parcel 
by parcel assessments were no differ-
ent from immunities and exemptions 
used for the benefit of other groups 
such as churches, the federal govern-
ment and the states. Id. 
The Court further held that state 
jurisdiction over reservation fee pat-
ented land was not inconsistent with 
the policies of preserving Indian self-
determination and self-government. 
The Court noted that while in personam 
jurisdiction would be disrupti ve to these 
policies (as they were in Moe), the 
power to assess property and collect 
taxes would not. Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 
692. The Court emphasized that the 
legislature, not the judiciary, was the 
correct forum to present these policy 
arguments because Congress, not the 
courts, had the power to repeal stat-
utes. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 
417 U.S. 535 (1974». 
Finally, the Court addressed 
whether the County's ad valorem and 
excise taxes were valid with respect to 
the reservation land. The Court ap-
plied its analysis to the County's ad 
valorem tax upon land and held that 
because this tax flowed from taxation 
ofland within the meaning ofthe Act, 
it was prima jacie valid. Id. With 
respect to what Congress intended to 
preempt regarding state taxation, the 
Court held that aper se rule ofinterpre-
tation must be followed which meant 
that whatever Congress decided was 
binding upon the courts. Id. at 693. 
The Court then examined the ex-
cise tax the County sought to impose 
upon Yakima Nation's property. The 
Court held that excise taxes were not 
permissible because although the ob-
ject ofthe excise tax was the sale ofthe 
land, the land in question was not the 
object of the tax, and thus did not 
invoke the protection provided by the 
Burke Act. Id. The Court explained 
that whenever there are two possible 
constructions of a statute relating to the 
rights of American Indians, it was the 
custom of the Court to construe the 
statute liberally in favor ofthe Indians. 
Id. The Court further held that even 
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though an excise tax created a lien 
upon the land between the time the 
property was sold and the time the tax 
was paid, this lien did not convert the 
tax into a tax upon real estate; it re-
mained a tax upon the Indians' activity 
of selling the land. Id. at 693-94. 
In County of Yakima v. Yakima 
Indian Nation, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Act explicitly autho-
rized taxation of fee patented land but 
not taxation with respect to or involv-
ing land, or based upon the value of 
land. As a result, counties are forbid-
den to impose an excise tax on fee 
patented land. While this decision 
clarified the limits upon which a county 
may tax fee patented property held by 
individual tribe members, it also de-
prived these Indians ofthe federal pro-
tection from state and local taxation 
originally given to them by Congress. 
- Carolyn M Brennan 
Dawson v. Delaware: EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S RACIST AS-
SOCIATIONS OR BELIEFS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL SEN-
TENCING PROCEEDING UN-
LESS RELEVANT TO THE IS-
SUES ADDRESSED IN THE UN-
DERL YING CONVICTION. 
In Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 
1093 (1992), the United States Su-
preme Court held that in a capital sen-
tencing proceeding, evidence of the 
defendant's membership in a racist 
prison gang was inadmissible because 
it was not relevant to the issues being 
decided at the penalty proceeding or 
related to the underlying conviction. 
In vacating the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Delaware, the Court 
determined that the admission of a 
stipulation evidencing the defendant's 
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood 
violated his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights under the United 
States Constitution. 
David Dawson and three other in-
mates escaped from a Delaware prison 
in late 1986. After burglarizing a house 
in Kenton, Delaware, Dawson pro-
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ceeded to another house nearby where 
he brutally murdered a white woman 
and then stole her car and money. 
Dawson was subsequently apprehended 
by the police. 
At trial, the jury convicted Dawson 
of first-degree murder, possession ofa 
deadly weapon during the commission 
of a felony, and various other crimes. 
A penalty hearing was then held before 
the jury to determine whether to im-
pose the death penalty for the first 
degree murder conviction. 
The State notified the court that it 
intended to introduce expert testimony 
pertaining to Dawson's membership 
in a prison gang known as the Aryan 
Brotherhood ("Brotherhood") as well 
as evidence of Dawson's tatoos and 
other indicia of his membership in the 
Brotherhood. The State submitted that 
such testimony would explain the ori-
gin and nature of the Brotherhood. 
Dawson opposed admission of such 
evidence arguing that its admission 
would be inflammatory and would vio-
late his rights under the First and F our-
teenth Amendments. 
Prior to the start of the penalty 
hearing, the parties agreed upon a ne-
gotiated stipulation concerning the 
evidence of the defendant's member-
ship in the Brotherhood. In essence, 
the stipulation stated that the Brother-
hood was a white racist prison gang 
which originated in California and that 
separate gangs existed in Delaware 
using the same name. As a condition 
of the stipulation, the State did not 
introduce expert testimony during the 
penalty phase. 
During the penalty hearing, the State 
introduced the stipulation, Dawson's 
tatoos relating to the Brotherhood, his 
use of the name "Abaddan," and his 
lengthy criminal record. In rebuttal, 
Dawson presented mitigating "good 
character" evidence consisting oftesti-
mony of family members and records 
of his enrollment in drug and alcohol 
programs in prison for which he had 
received good time credits. 
The jury concluded that the miti-
gating evidence was outweighed by 
the aggravating evidence and recom-
mended that Dawson receive the death 
penalty. Upon that binding recom-
mendation, Dawson was so sentenced. 
The Supreme Court of Delaware, 
holding that it was desirable for the 
jury to have as much information be-
fore it as possible during the penalty 
hearing, affirmed the underlying con-
viction and the death penalty. The 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to consider whether the ad-
mission of evidence concerning 
Dawson's membership in the Brother-' 
hood during the sentencing proceeding 
violated his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment constitutional rights. 
The Court began its analysis by 
addressing Dawson's argument that 
theFirst Amendment absolutely barred 
the admission of evidence of an 
individual's beliefs or associations 
during a sentencing proceeding. 
Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1096. While 
recognizing that the First Amendment 
protects an "individual's right to join 
groups and associate with others," the 
Court rejected Dawson's assertion be-
cause it was overly broad. Id. By 
doing so, the Court reinforced its pre-
vious position that the sentencing au-
thority is "free to consider a wide range 
of relevant material," even that mate-
rial which may otherwise be constitu-
tionally protected. Id. at 1097. 
Having recognized that in certain 
instances otherwise constitutionally 
protected material may be admitted 
during a sentencing proceeding, the 
Court then considered whether the ad-
mission of the stipulation as to 
Dawson's membership in the Dela-
ware chapter of the Brotherhood was 
constitutional error. Id. at 1097. The 
touchstone ofthe Court's inquiry was 
whether the stipulation was in any way 
relevant to the issues to be determined 
in the sentencing proceeding. Id. 
The Court first noted that the ab-
sence of expert testimony to show the 
violent nature of the Brotherhood lim-
itedthe relevancy ofthe admitted stipu-
lation. Id. The Court reasoned that the 
narrow phrasing ofthe stipulation said 
